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Neoclassical investment models predict that firms should make frequent, small adjustments to their
capital stocks. Microeconomic evidence, however, shows just the opposite — firms make infrequent,
large adjustments to their capital stocks. In response, researchers have developed models with fixed
costs of adjustment to explain the data. While these models generate the observed firm-level investment
behavior, it is not clear that the aggregate behavior of these models differs importantly from the aggregate
behavior of neoclassical models. This is important since most of our existing understanding of investment
is based on models without fixed costs. Moreover, models with fixed costs have non-degenerate, time-varying
distributions of capital holdings across firms, making the models extremely difficult to analyze. This
paper shows that, for sufficiently long-lived capital, (1) the cross-sectional distribution of capital holdings
has virtually no bearing on the equilibrium and (2) the aggregate behavior of the fixed-cost model
is virtually identical to that of the neoclassical model. The findings are due to a near infinite elasticity
of investment timing for long-lived capital goods — a feature that fixed-cost models and neoclassical
models share. The analysis shows that the so-called "irrelevance results" obtained in recent numerical











Conventional neoclassical investment models typically assume that capital adjustment 
costs rise smoothly with investment and thus predict that firms should make frequent, 
small adjustments to their capital stocks.  Microeconomic evidence, however, shows that 
many firms make infrequent, large adjustments to their capital stocks.  Motivated by the 
micro-evidence, researchers have developed investment models that feature fixed costs of 
adjustment.  While these models generate the observed firm-level investment behavior, it 
is not clear whether the aggregate equilibrium behavior of such models differs 
significantly from the equilibrium behavior generated by more conventional investment 
models.  Several prominent numerical studies of calibrated DSGE models with fixed 
adjustment costs suggest that there may be only minor differences between the two 
models.  The cause of these “irrelevance results” is typically attributed to consumption 
smoothing forces present in general equilibrium settings.  The irrelevance results have 
been contested by other researchers on the grounds that they hold only for some 
parameter values and are not a general feature of equilibrium models with fixed costs.    
  The aggregate behavior of models with fixed adjustment costs is important for 
several reasons.  Much of our existing understanding of investment is based on 
neoclassical models that abstract from fixed adjustment costs.  Because the earlier models 
contrast sharply with the microeconomic evidence, researchers are justifiably concerned 
that policy conclusions or econometric predictions based on these models may be 
misleading.  On the other hand, if the aggregate behavior of the two modeling 
frameworks is similar, then the apparent failure of conventional neoclassical models at 
the micro level does not necessarily imply that we need to abandon neoclassical modeling 
techniques to analyze aggregate investment.  Indeed, there may be reasons to prefer the 
neoclassical framework.  Unlike neoclassical investment models, fixed-cost models are 
analytically very cumbersome.  Models with fixed costs typically have non-degenerate 
distributions of capital across firms.  The distribution is a time-varying object which 
enters the models as an additional state variable and makes the models extremely difficult 
to analyze, particularly in equilibrium settings.     
This paper analyzes the approximate equilibrium behavior of an investment model 
where fixed costs matter at the microeconomic level.  I focus on long-lived investment  
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goods – investment goods with low rates of economic depreciation.  The main insight of 
the paper is that, in the face of fixed adjustment costs, optimal investment behavior is 
characterized by an extremely high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for investment 
purchases.  For sufficiently long-lived capital goods (goods with low rates of economic 
depreciation), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is nearly infinite.  This property 
has a number of implications.   
First, for long-lived investment goods, the underlying distribution of capital 
holdings across firms has little bearing on the equilibrium.  Because firms are willing to 
drastically change the timing of their investments, firms that are bunched up or spread out 
relative to the steady state distribution can simply delay or accelerate the timing of their 
investment purchases to avoid high prices or take advantage of low prices.  Thus, the 
high intertemporal elasticity of investment timing effectively breaks the link between the 
distribution of firms’ capital holdings and aggregate investment, thereby eliminating any 
role for the cross-sectional distribution at the aggregate level.   
Second, the near infinite elasticity of investment timing is a property that the 
fixed-cost model shares with the neoclassical investment model.  In an instructive 
limiting case in which the economic depreciation rate approaches zero, the equilibrium in 
the fixed-cost model corresponds exactly to the equilibrium in the neoclassical model.  
Thus, at the aggregate level, investment and investment prices, particularly for long-lived 
capital goods, can be accurately analyzed with traditional, neoclassical investment 
models.  While the traditional models cannot match the behavior of the firms at the 
microeconomic level, they provide an easy, reliable guide to aggregate behavior, policy 
analysis and empirical predictions.  This finding supports the recent “irrelevance results” 
in Thomas [2002] and Veracierto [2002].  Indeed, rather than being an artifact of a 
particular calibration, the irrelevance results reflect deep, fundamental properties of 
investment models with long-lived capital goods.   
In contrast to the received wisdom of the literature, the source of the equivalence 
between neoclassical models and fixed-cost models is not consumption smoothing per se.  
Because both neoclassical and fixed-cost models have high intertemporal elasticities for 
the timing of investment, anything that causes the effective price of new capital goods to 
increase with aggregate investment will make the models difficult to distinguish with  
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aggregate data.  Thus, an increasing quadratic adjustment cost in a neoclassical 
framework and an upward-sloping supply curve in the fixed-cost model will result in the 
same equilibrium paths provided that the elasticity of the marginal cost of investment is 
the same in each case.  Consumption smoothing in DSGE models is but one source of an 
increasing marginal cost of investment and is not the key cause of the equivalence 
between the models.   
I supplement the approximate analytical results with numerical analysis.  The 
analysis shows that the limiting approximations are highly accurate even for realistic 
depreciation rates away from the low-depreciation limit.  Among other things, the 
numerical analysis shows that while there are substantial variations in the cross-sectional 
moments of the distribution, these moments provide little information on the evolution of 
future prices and investment.   
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section II presents background 
information and provides a brief overview of the related literature.  Section III presents 
the basic model and analyzes the equilibrium in the low depreciation limit.  Section IV 
presents a numerical analysis of the model and considers the quantitative performance of 
the limiting analysis in environments with realistic depreciation rates.  Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
In micro data, plant level investment is characterized by long periods of relative inaction 
punctuated by episodes of high investment.  Thus, rather than spreading investments over 
time, firms make large, infrequent adjustments to their capital stocks.  Doms and Dunne 
[1998] show that, for U.S. manufacturing, most plants experience at least one year in 
which their capital stock rises by at least 50 percent.  For many establishments, half of all 
plant-level investment spending over a 17-year horizon is concentrated in the three years 
surrounding the year with the plant’s greatest investment.  Cooper et al. [1999] show that 
each year, roughly 1 out of every 5 manufacturing plants experiences an “investment 
spike,” which they define as an increase in plant-level capital of at least 20 percent.  
Aggregate variation in investment spikes accounts for the bulk of the variation in U.S. 
manufacturing investment.  Gourio and Kashyap [2007] show that the aggregate variation  
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in investment spikes is primarily driven by changes in the number of firms experiencing 
spikes rather than changes in the average size of spikes.
1  Taken as a whole, the evidence 
from the micro-data stands in stark contrast to the predictions of standard neoclassical 
investment models with convex adjustment costs (e.g., Abel [1982], Hayashi [1982] and 
Summers [1981]).  Models with fixed costs rationalize the lumpy investment behavior 
seen in the data.  To avoid paying the fixed cost, firms make infrequent, large changes to 
their capital stock.   
Unlike earlier convex models, investment models with fixed costs are difficult to 
solve even in partial equilibrium settings and are often completely intractable in general 
equilibrium.  Indeed, much of the recent literature focuses simply on numerically solving 
such models.  The difficulty in solving these models arises because not all firms have the 
same capital stock.  At any point in time, some firms have old, outdated capital and are 
likely to adjust in the near term while other firms have recently adjusted and will not 
purchase new capital for quite some time.  The distribution of capital stocks changes 
whenever shocks or policies disturb the market.   Thus, to solve the model, one must keep 
track of an endogenous, time-varying distribution of capital holdings across firms.   
Because the position and dynamics of the distribution of capital holdings can 
influence the equilibrium, the distribution often plays a prominent role in the questions 
posed by the literature on fixed costs.  For example, suppose there is an unusually large 
number of firms with relatively old capital.  This situation might be thought of as “pent-
up demand.”  In this case, one would expect to see a predictable surge of demand in the 
near term as these firms update their capital.  Thus, investment prices would be high in 
the short-run and fall as time passes.  The opposite scenario is also possible.  If many 
firms recently adjusted, then there would be few firms that currently need new capital.  
This situation might be thought of as “capital overhang.”  In this case, investment 
demand and prices should be unusually low in the near term.  Only later, when the other 
firms’ capital depreciates sufficiently, will investment demand recover.  Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Doms and Dunne [1998] and Cooper et al. [1999] base their findings on data from the Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD), which includes most U.S. manufacturing plants.  Gourio and Kashyap [2007] 
use both LRD and Chilean data on manufacturing plants. (See also Fuentes and Gilchrist [2005] and 
Fuentes et al. [2006].)  Like Cooper et al. [1999], Gourio and Kashyap define investment spikes to be 
increases in plant-level capital of 20 percent or more and show that variation in aggregate investment is 
associated with variation in aggregate investment spikes.  (See also Cooper and Haltiwanger [2006].)     
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economic policies could have different effects in each case.  In the pent-up demand case, 
a tax subsidy might have a considerable impact on investment since there are many firms 
close to the point at which they would invest.  In the capital overhang case, because there 
are very few firms with low capital stocks, the same subsidy might have little effect.
2  In 
theory, each different configuration of the distribution could imply a different equilibrium 
outcome and have different policy implications.   
The cross-sectional distribution of capital thus presents both a problem and an 
opportunity for researchers.  Accounting for the equilibrium behavior of an endogenous 
distribution is computationally and analytically very difficult.  The combination of an 
incredibly large state space (the distribution) and highly non-linear behavior on the part 
of firms makes fixed-cost models difficult to analyze even in numerical settings.  At the 
same time, variations in the cross sectional distribution could have rich implications for 
the study of investment behavior and policy analysis.   
While many researchers have analyzed models of investment with heterogeneous 
agents and fixed costs, most of the well known results in this area come from models of 
individual firms taking prices as given.
3  Caballero and Engel [1999] assume that all 
supply curves are perfectly elastic.  This is tantamount to working in a partial equilibrium 
framework since, with perfectly flat supply curves, investment decisions of other firms 
have no influence on equilibrium prices.  Adda and Cooper [2000] analyze a model of 
consumer durables with discrete replacement.  Like Caballero and Engel, Adda and 
Cooper assume that prices, though stochastic, are independent of aggregate investment.  
In both cases, the complexity that arises from the distribution is suppressed.     
Because obtaining analytical results for models with fixed costs in equilibrium 
settings is difficult, much of the progress in this area has been made with numerical 
studies of particular dynamic models.
4  Using numerical techniques, Thomas [2002] and 
                                                 
2 Adda and Cooper [2000] present a dynamic analysis of a French automobile scrapping subsidy with 
implications exactly in this spirit.  
3 See, among others, Abel and Eberly [1994], Bertola and Cabellero [1990], Cabellero [1993], Caballero 
and Leahy [1996], Caballero and Engel [1999], Cooper and Haltiwanger [1993], Cooper et al. [1999], Dixit 
and Pindyck [1994], and Eberly [1994].  For studies that confine attention to steady state analysis, see, 
Caplin and Spulber [1987], Hendel and Lizzeri [1999, 2002], House and Leahy [2004], House and 
Ozdenoren [2007], and Stolyarov [2002].  Caplin and Leahy [1991, 1997] make the simplifying assumption 
that firm-level investment demand does not react to endogenous changes in the distribution of firms. 
4 Typically, analytical results require strong assumptions to facilitate analysis.  See Danziger [1999] for a 
closed-form analysis of a model with fixed costs.  Gertler and Leahy [2006] adapt Danziger’s approach to a  
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Veracierto [2002] find that calibrated DSGE models with fixed costs behave almost 
identically to conventional DSGE models that abstract from such micro-frictions.   
Thomas [2002] and Khan and Thomas [2007] attribute these “irrelevance results” to the 
consumption smoothing motives of the representative household in their models.  Gourio 
and Kashyap [2007] and Bachmann, et al. [2008] have challenged these results on the 
grounds that they hold only for certain parameter values and are not general properties of 
models with fixed adjustment costs. While numerical analysis has advanced rapidly in 
recent years, numerical techniques are limited to solving and cataloging particular cases.  
Furthermore, the techniques required are still quite cumbersome and the underlying 
economic forces at play are often obscured.  The main objective of this paper is to shed 
light on these forces.   
  
III. MODEL 
The basic structure of the model is inspired by the model in Caplin and Leahy [2004, 
2006].  The model is in continuous time.  The demand side of the model consists of a 
continuum of firms (measure one) that maximize their discounted profits net of 
investment costs.  Firms discount the future at the discount rate r .  Each firm owns a 
stock of capital k , which depreciates exponentially at the rate δ.  Because I focus on 
long-lived investment goods, I assume the depreciation rate is less than five percent 
annually.  Flow profits are  ( ) ( ) Atkt
α , where 01 α <<  and  () A t  is a shock to the 
profitability of capital.  When a firm adjusts its capital stock, say from k  to  ' k , it incurs 
two costs.  The first is a fixed cost of adjustment  0 F > , which is paid whenever 
investment at the firm is non-zero.  The second is a cost per-unit of investment given by 
[ ] () ' p tkk ⋅−.  To make matters simple, I assume that when a firm adjusts, it must adjust 
to a fixed level of capital k .  (The assumption of a constant reset level is innocuous. I 
discuss this assumption further later.)  Thus, the firm’s problem is simply to decide when 
                                                                                                                                                 
more conventional model of price rigidity.  Caplin and Leahy [2006] assume that idiosyncratic depreciation 
shocks smooth out the distribution over time thus simplifying the solution.  Feasible numerical approaches 
have only recently been made available.  Krusell and Smith [1997, 1998] assume that expectations are 
based on a small number of moments of the distribution rather than on the entire distribution (see also Rios-
Rull [1999]).  Other approaches use additional heterogeneity to make the model differentiable so that linear 
methods can be used.  For examples of the latter, see Dotsey, et al. [1999], Thomas [2002], Veracierto 
[2002], Khan and Thomas [2003] and King and Thomas [2006].     
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to adjust.  If the firm doesn’t adjust, its capital stock obeys kk δ =−   .  If the firm makes 
an adjustment at time T, it jumps from its current capital stock  () kT  to the reset level of 
capital k  and incurs the adjustment cost  () () p Tkk T F ⎡ ⎤ ⋅− + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .   
  To focus attention on the demand side of the model, the supply side is 
intentionally kept as simple as possible.  The flow supply of investment is governed by an 
investment supply curve  () () (() ) p tz t S I t = ⋅ .   () I t  is the flow supply of aggregate 
investment,  () p t  is the prevailing market price of new investment goods and  () zt  is an 
investment supply shock.  The supply curve is upward sloping ( '0 S > ) and  () 00 S = .  
Note that the model has no representative consumer and thus has no direct role for 
consumption smoothing as emphasized in the DSGE literature.   
  A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a fixed point in prices.  Taking the price path 
() p t  and the productivity path  () A t  as given, firms make optimal investment decisions.  
The investment decisions imply a time path for aggregate investment  
  ( ) () ()
0
,, I tf s t i s t d s
∞
=∫ , (1) 
where  ( ) , f ts is the date t measure of firms with capital of age s and  (,) ist is optimal 
investment for a firm at date t that last adjusted s periods ago.  Aggregate investment then 
implies a price path  '( ) ( ) ( ( )) p tz t S I t = ⋅ .  Equilibrium requires  '( ) ( ) p tp t = .   
Obtaining analytical results for equilibrium models with fixed costs is virtually 
impossible.  Consequently, almost all results for these models come from numerical 
examples (the solution of which is also quite difficult).  The difficulty in solving the 
model arises from the presence of the time-varying distribution f – an infinite-
dimensional, endogenous state variable.  The strategy I follow in this paper is to derive 
approximate analytical results by establishing some basic properties of firm behavior and 
incentives in the steady state.  These properties can be used to analyze the approximate 
behavior of the system away from the steady state.  I then use numerical techniques to 
confirm the approximate analytical results.   
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3.1 The Optimal Timing of Investment in the Steady State 
In the steady state, the price level and the level of productivity are constant.  I normalize 
both the steady state price (p) and steady state productivity (A) to be 1.  Let V  denote the 
steady state value of having k  units of capital and behaving optimally.  The optimization 
problem of a typical firm is to choose a time to adjust T to maximize  
  () ()
0
T
rt t rT rT T VT e e k d t e V F e k e k
α δδ −− − − − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =+ −− − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∫ . (2) 
The first order condition for the optimal choice of T is   
  () () () () ( ) 0 T VT k T r V F k r k T
α
δ ⎡ ⎤ = −− − − += ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , (3) 
where  ()
T kT e k
δ − = .  At the optimum, the loss the firm would incur by waiting a bit 
more (dT) is zero.  The first term in  T V  is the gain the firm would get by using its existing 
capital stock more.  The second term reflects the fact that waiting delays the payoff 
0 VFk −−> .  The last term shows that the firm also suffers by delaying the resale of 
its existing capital and because the capital stock deteriorates, reducing its resale value.  At 
the optimum, all of these forces balance and the firm is indifferent between adjusting and 
waiting.   
The second order condition shows what happens to the first-order costs and 
benefits as the firm delays or accelerates adjustment.  The second order condition 
requires  
  () () ( )
1
0 kT kT r
α
δα δ
− ⎡ ⎤ − +> ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. (4) 
Condition (4) says that if it is optimal to adjust at time T, then the marginal product of 






 must be strictly greater than the user cost of 
capital  r δ + .  The difference between the marginal product and the user cost plays an 
important role in the analysis.  I refer to this difference as the Jorgenson gap and denote it 
as  () ( ) ( )
1




= − + .   
  While I do not allow the firm to choose its reset level of capital k , I assume that 
k  is optimal in the steady state.  If the firm adjusts every T periods, and has a reset 




















⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ − ⎪⎪ ⎡ ⎤ = − + − ⎨⎬ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎪ − + ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
, (5) 





T rT rt t ee k d tk e r
α αδ δα αδ
− − + −− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ = − + ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∫ .  If the firm 
could choose its reset capital stock, then k  would solve  () {} max , k VkT k − .  The first 





















⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − + ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎡⎤ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ =+ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜ ⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎝⎠ ⎜ + − ⎝⎠
, (6) 
where I have written  () , kT δ  to reflect the dependence of the optimal reset level on the 
parameters δ and T.  One can show that the marginal product of capital at k  is less than 
the user cost r δ + .  For reference, I let 
J k  denote the capital stock at which the standard 




− ⎡⎤ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ .  Thus, k  exceeds the frictionless capital 
stock 
J k , which in turn exceeds the capital stock at the optimal adjustment horizon 
() kT.  Note that  ( ) 0 lim ,
J
T kT k δ → = , so as the horizon T gets shorter, the normal user 
cost relationship emerges.  Figure 1 shows the relationship between  () kT, 
J k ,  () , kT δ  
and the Jorgenson gap  () , GT δ .  
  It is easy to show that the condition  () ,0 T Vk T =  implies condition (3).  This first 
order condition gives the optimal T for any given k  and any F.  Alternatively, I can 
invert the first order condition to find a fixed cost  ( ) ,0 FT δ >  that rationalizes a given 
adjustment horizon T and a given  () , kT δ .  I prefer to cast the problem in terms of 
adjustment horizons (T) rather than fixed costs (F) since firms’ adjustment horizons are 
more easily observed than are their fixed costs.  Thus, in what follows, I devote relatively 
little attention to the magnitude of the fixed costs themselves and instead focus on the 
length of time it takes firms to adjust.  In Cooper et al. [1999], 18 percent of firms 
experience an investment spike each year implying an average adjustment horizon of 
roughly five to six years.   
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3.2 The Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution. 
In this section I demonstrate that firms in the fixed-cost model have very high 
intertemporal elasticities of substitution for the timing of investment purchases.  This 
high intertemporal elasticity is the key observation that allows us to analyze the solution.  
It is also a property that fixed-cost models share with neoclassical investment models.   
Consider the loss to the firm from adjusting early or late by an amount dT .  The 
loss from this suboptimal behavior is  () ( ) ( ) Ld T VT VT d T = − + , which, to a second 
order approximation, is  




Ld T V T d T ≈− > .  
Since T is optimal, we can use (3) and (4) to show that  
  () ()




Ld T G T
dT dT





⎢⎥ ≈ < ⎢⎥ ⎡⎤ + − + −− ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
. (7) 
Equation (7) says that the loss relative to the annuity value of the firm’s profits is less 
than  ()
2
/2 dT δα .  To put this in quantitative terms, consider compensating the firm to 
invest one year in advance ( 1 dT = ).  If the annual depreciation rate were four percent 
( .04 δ = ) and if  .5 α = , then the left-hand side of (7) would need to be no greater than 
.01.  That is, the firm would require only one percent of its annual flow profits in 
compensation for adjusting early (or late) by one year.  Equation (7) also shows that the 
loss is related to the size of the Jorgenson gap  () , GT δ .  If  () , GT δ  is small, then the loss 
is even less than  ()
2
/2 dT δα .   
  This finding – that losses from adjusting early or late even by large amounts are 
small relative to flow profits – provides our first glimpse into why the underlying 
distribution of firms has little influence on the aggregate behavior of investment.  Figure 
2 plots two distributions of firms’ capital holdings in an environment in which firms 
adjust every 10 years in the steady state.  The shaded rectangle represents the steady state 
distribution of capital holdings.  The steady state distribution is uniform.  There is an 
equal number of firms with capital of every age.  The heavy dark line represents an 
extreme alternate distribution in which the firms are concentrated on only five capital 
vintages.  Each vintage is owned by 1/5 of the firms and there are no other capital  
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vintages.  In fact, because the firms are so willing to retime their investments, this 
distribution is much closer to the steady state distribution than it appears.  Suppose we 
modify the usual profit maximization requirement for equilibrium and instead require that 
firms only come within  0 ε>  of maximum profits.  This relaxed version of equilibrium 
is sometimes referred to as an ε-equilibrium (see Everett [1957]).  With the parameter 
values above, adjusting early or late by one year costs the firm at most one percent of its 
annual flow profits.  If  () () 0.01 rV F k ε ⎡ ⎤ = −− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , then the steady state price and 
investment paths  () 1 pt p ==  and  () I tI =  for all t constitute an ε-equilibrium for both 
the steady state distribution and the extreme distribution.  Even though the distribution 
looks starkly different from uniform, it is actually within ε of the steady state.   
Returning to strictly optimal firm behavior, consider the change in payoffs from a 
small change in the purchase price of capital dp.  In this case, the change in the payoff is 
simply  () dp k k T ⎡⎤ −− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ .  Putting this loss relative to the annuity value of profits gives 
  ()




T Ld p e
dp




⎡ ⎤ − ⎢⎥ = ⎢⎥ ⎡⎤ + − + −− ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
, (8) 
which is positive if prices rise and negative if they fall.  Using (7) we can solve for the 
price change required to make the firm indifferent between adjusting now and adjusting 
















Not surprisingly, the Jorgenson gap  () , GT δ  again emerges as the central determining 
factor for how willing firms are to retime capital purchases in response to price changes.   
At this point, it helps to get a sense of the magnitude of the gap.  Recall that 
() ( ) ( )
1




= − + .  If  k  is optimal, then  () , kT δ  satisfies equation (6) so that 
() () ,
T kT e k T
δ δ
− =  and we can solve directly for  () , GT δ .  To get a simple expression 
for  () , GT δ , notice that (6) suggests that, for small T, the optimal reset level  ( ) , kT δ  is 
not far from the frictionless level 
J k .  If we assume that  () ,
J kT k δ ≈ , then   
  () ( )( ) ( )
1
,1
TJ GT ek r r T
α δ δα δ δ δ α
− − ⎡ ⎤ ≈− + ≈ + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , (10)  
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− −≈ − .  For example, if  10 T = ,  .04 δ = ,  .02 r = , and 
.5 α = , then (10) suggests that  () , .012 GT δ ≈ .  Thus, the gap between the marginal 
product and the user cost when the firm adjusts is roughly 1 percentage point.  Because 
the approximation above assumes that 
J kk =  rather than  () ,
J kkT k δ => , the true gap 
is actually somewhat smaller than the approximation suggests.  Figure 3 plots the exact 
() , GT δ  for several time horizons T and depreciation rates δ.   
We can now use (9) and (10) to find the price change required to induce a firm to 
change its investment timing by an amount dT.   




dp r dT δδα ≈− + − . 
For long-lived investment goods, this price change is very small indeed.  Mechanically, 
the magnitude of the price change is dominated by the presence of the term  ( ) r δδ +  
which is very small for depreciation rates less than .05.  For example, given the 
parameters above, the price change required to induce a firm to change its timing by one 
year is roughly  0.0006 dp ≈−  or 6 basis points (6/100ths of one percent).  By retiming 
their investments, the firms will cause investment to be greatly smoothed out at the 
aggregate level.  The price incentives necessary to achieve this smoothing are so small 
that they will not be detectable in data.   
Of course, the quantitative evaluation above depends on parameters.  Using a 
higher discount rate, or a lower curvature parameter α will increase the price response, 
though not by a large amount.  Increasing r to .08 or reducing α to zero will both 
increase the price change to 12 basis points. (Gourio and Kashyap [2007] use a numerical 
model to analyze the effects of changing α.)    Adding economic growth acts like a form 
of depreciation.  With growth, the price change is  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1/2 1 gr g d T δδα − ++ +− .  
If .02 g = , then the price response would again be 12 basis points.   
  Another way to see the same point is to compute a price path for which the firm is 
indifferent as to when to adjust.  If we allow for a time-varying price  ( ) p t  in (2), then the 
first-order condition for T is   
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. (11) 
If the firm were indifferent between any adjustment horizon, then (11) must hold for all 
T.  The solution to this differential equation satisfies  
  () ()
1 1
t
tr t VF e







− = − +
+
, (12) 
where C is an unknown constant.
5  Restricting the path to satisfy  () 1 pT =  we have  




T p te r t T
δ δδα
− ≈− + −− . 
If the gap  () , GT δ  is small, the indifferent price path stays close to the steady state price 
1 p = .  Clearly the price path that makes firms indifferent about when to adjust is more 
flat for long-lived capital than for short-lived capital.   
Figure 4 plots several indifferent price paths for various depreciation rates δ 
assuming that firms adjust every 10 years in steady state.  All of the indifferent price 
paths are quite flat.  Even for  .2 δ = , the firm requires only a 2 percent price cut to adjust  
two years early or late.  For  .05 δ = , a price reduction of only 20 basis points is enough 
to cause the firm to delay or accelerate investment by roughly two years.  Again, the 
important thing to realize is that the indifferent price paths are very close to the steady 
state price.  Put differently, in the steady state, while it is optimal to adjust at date T, the 
firm is willing to adjust at almost any date.   
 
3.3 Implications 
In this section I consider the consequences of the near infinite elasticity of investment 
demand with respect to anticipated price changes in fixed-cost models.  I also compare 
the fixed-cost model with a standard neoclassical investment model.  The comparison 
reveals that the equilibrium behavior of both models can be reduced to a simple supply 
and demand system.  The supply and demand analysis allows me to summarize how 
various shocks influence the equilibrium.   
 
                                                 
5 To derive this condition, I assume the reset value V  is independent of the time of adjustment T.    
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Investment Demand.  The analysis above shows that slight changes in prices cause firms 
to dramatically alter the timing of their investment decisions.  For sufficiently long-lived 
investment projects and sufficiently patient firms (low δ and low r), the incentive to 
delay or accelerate investment in response to predictable price changes is nearly infinite.  
Thus, despite the apparent complexity of the fixed-cost model, characterizing its dynamic 
behavior is disarmingly simple.  Investment demand is approximately summarized by a 
perfectly flat demand curve.  The demand curve may shift, but these shifts are 
unpredictable.  Specifically, the demand curve will shift in response to highly persistent 
innovations.  If the shocks confronting the firm are short-lived, and thus have little impact 
on the long-run value of capital, the demand curve simply remains close to the steady 
state price.  This continues to be true regardless of whether there are relatively many or 
relatively few firms near the steady state adjustment trigger.  If there are many firms 
considering adjustment, the demand curve shifts to the right.  If few firms are at near the 
adjustment margin, the demand curve shifts to the left.  Because demand is nearly 
horizontal, the price is unaffected and the equilibrium quantity of investment is 
determined solely by the supply curve.   
  The reader may be struck that the implied price path is so close to a partial 
equilibrium framework (in which prices are assumed to be fixed), but yet aggregate 
investment is not influenced by the micro-level heterogeneity.  After all, researchers have 
previously found that the distribution of capital has effects in partial equilibrium settings.  
Of course, the two results are perfectly consistent.  Because firms are so sensitive to price 
changes, even a seemingly small departure from perfectly constant prices will cause 
dramatic changes in the equilibrium.  This is why the early partial equilibrium models 
produce results that are in stark contrast to the more recent equilibrium models and is 
why partial equilibrium analyses of fixed cost models give such misleading results.   
  The near invariance of prices to transitory shocks in equilibrium is why the 
assumption of a constant reset capital stock (k ) has little bearing on the outcome.  If 
prices changed over time then the firms would optimally vary the reset level.  However, 
since prices are essentially constant, the optimal reset level is also essentially constant.   
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(Giving the firms the option to vary the reset capital level with prices makes them even 




Comparison with Neoclassical Investment Models.  The extremely high intertemporal 
elasticity of investment demand is a feature that the fixed-cost model shares with 
neoclassical investment models and it is why the two models, though very different at the 
micro-level, are often indistinguishable at the aggregate level.  In neoclassical settings, 
firms equate the marginal cost of investment with the marginal benefit of more capital.  





qt e M P sd s
δ ∞ − + =∫ , (13) 
where  ()
k MPs  is the marginal product of capital at time s.  For the optimal level of 
investment,  () () qt pt = . 
For low δ and low r, there cannot be large predictable movements in the shadow 
value of capital  ( ) qt.  With sufficiently long-lived capital and sufficiently short-lived 
shocks, one can safely approximate  ( ) qt with its steady state value q .
7  The marginal 
value of capital  ( ) qt is a discounted sum of payoffs.  If the firm is patient and 
depreciation is slow, the integral places substantial weight on terms in the distant future.  
Because transitory shocks influence only the first few terms in the integral, they have a 
negligible impact on the value of capital and thus  () qt q ≈ .  By affecting most or all of 
the terms in the integral, more persistent, long-lasting shocks have a substantial effect on 
( ) qt.  Nevertheless, since the shadow value is largely determined by the future terms in 
(13),  ( ) qt will remain virtually constant in expected value.   
For sufficiently long-lived capital goods, the investment demand curves implied 
by the neoclassical model and the fixed cost model are the same.  Because it is nearly 
perfectly elastic with respect to predictable variations in prices, investment demand can 
                                                 
6 Using the numerical model in Section IV, I evaluated the relative performance of a model with a variable 
reset capital stock.  The outcomes were essentially the same.    
7 Barsky et al. [2007] and House and Shapiro [2008] evaluate the accuracy of this approximation in 
neoclassical settings.     
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be approximately summarized by a flat line at the steady state price.  As a result, in the 
low-depreciation limit, any differences in equilibrium outcomes reflect differences in the 
specification of supply.  If supply is the same in the two models, then the equilibrium 
outcome in the fixed-cost model and the equilibrium outcome in the neoclassical model 
will be virtually identical.  More precisely, in the low-depreciation limit, both models 
have identical reactions to transitory shocks.  Neither transitory supply shocks nor 
transitory demand shocks cause perceptible changes in prices and only supply shocks 
cause changes in investment.
8   
 
The Distribution of Capital Holdings. The distribution of capital holdings features 
prominently in both the theoretical and empirical literature on fixed costs.  In theory, the 
equilibrium should depend on the cross sectional distribution of capital holdings across 
firms.  In empirical studies, researchers have tried to test whether observed variations in 
the distribution predict future movements in investment and prices.  Using LRD data, 
Caballero et al. [1995] show that changes in the distribution of capital explain changes in 
the responsiveness of investment to shocks.  Similar results are in Caballero and Engel 
[1999] who use BEA investment data and show that the distribution has predictive power 
for aggregate investment.  
The analysis in this paper suggests that, for sufficiently long-lived investments, 
variations in the distribution of capital holdings across firms should have no independent 
influence on equilibrium investment or prices.  In particular, if the only changes to the 
system are changes in the distribution, then equilibrium prices and investment should 
remain close to their steady state levels.  Thus, the model and analysis so far indicate that, 
for long-lived investments, the coefficients on moments of the cross-sectional distribution 
in forecasting regressions should be close to zero and the increase in predictive power 
from adding additional moments should be negligible.  That is, knowledge of the 
distribution should provide little to no information regarding the future behavior of 
investment or prices.   
                                                 
8 This is reminiscent of recent work by Jonas Fisher who argues that investment supply shocks are 
primarily responsible for aggregate business cycle fluctuations.  See Fisher [2006].    
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Of course, the analysis above is only approximate.  Furthermore, the identical 
behavior of the neoclassical model and the fixed-cost model, and the irrelevance of the 
distribution are results that we should expect only in the low-depreciation limit.  In the 
next section, I consider a numerical version of the model to assess the accuracy of the 
approximate solution and the limiting results.  The numerical model shows that the 
approximation is accurate even for modest depreciation rates.   
 
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS 
 
Based on the analysis in Section III and the discussion in Section 3.3, we should expect to 
observe the following in fixed-cost models for long-lived investments: (1) a temporary 
cost shock should have no noticeable effect on the price of new capital but should reduce 
equilibrium investment by the amount of the shock; (2) a temporary demand shock 
(modeled as a temporary increase in  A) should have virtually no influence on prices or 
investment; (3) different initial distributions of capital should have no consequences for 
prices or investment; and (4) for sufficiently transitory shocks, the aggregate behavior of 
the fixed-cost model should be identical to the aggregate behavior of a conventional 
neoclassical investment model.  
In this section I analyze a numerical version of the model in Section III.  The 
numerical model confirms the limiting analysis of the preceding section and allows me to 
evaluate the accuracy of the approximation for realistic parameter values.  I begin by 
sketching out the broad features of the numerical model.  The details of the numerical 
solution are in the appendix.   
 
4.1 Quantitative Model 
The numerical model is cast in discrete time with time intervals of size Δ.  There are 
1 J +  possible capital stocks  12 , , ,  ...,  J kkk k  with 
j
j ke k
−Δ = .  The lowest possible 
capital stock is  J k .  Let  , j t V  be the value of having capital stock j at time t and let  t V  be 
the value of having the reset level k  at time t.    
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The numerical solution uses a method developed jointly by Robert King, Julia 
Thomas and Marcelo Veracierto.
9  The key simplifying assumption of the method is to 
assume that firms draw idiosyncratic fixed costs of adjustment each period.  Thus, instead 
of facing the fixed cost F each period, firm i faces the stochastic fixed cost  , it ε  where 
() , it εε Ψ ∼ ,  , it E F ε ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ,  , 0 it ε ≥  and  , it ε  is i.i.d. across periods and across firms.  For 
purposes of computation, I assume that  , it ε  is a mixture of a log-normal random variable 
and a wide uniform.  Given a time interval Δ, I construct the discount factor 
r e β
−Δ = .  I 
can then write the value for a firm with cost draw ε, capital stock  j kk =  at time t as  
  () () {} ,1 , 1 1 , 1 max , jt t j t j t t t t t j VA k E v A k E v p k k
αα εβ β ε ++ + ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = Δ⋅ + Δ⋅ + −− − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , (14) 
where  
  () () ,,
0
jt jt vV d εε
∞
= Ψ ∫ . (15) 
The marginal firms with capital stock j have critical cost draw  
  () ,1 , 1 1 , 1 ˆj ttjt t j t t j A kk E v v p k k
αα εβ ++ + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =Δ⋅ − + −− − ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ . (16) 
The critical  , ˆj t ε  is differentiable.  Firms with cost draws higher than  , ˆj t ε  choose not to 
adjust and firms with cost draws lower than  , ˆj t ε  adjust.  If a firm with capital stock j 
chooses to adjust, its investment is  j kk − .  Aggregate investment  t I  is the sum of 
individual firm-level investment.   
  To close the model, I assume an isoelastic supply curve  
  ()
1
tt t p zI I ξ = ⋅ . (17) 
Here  ξ  is the elasticity of investment supply, I  is steady state investment and  t z  is a 
cost shock with mean 1.  The cost shock (z) and the productivity shock (A) are assumed 
to have simple autoregressive forms  
  () 1, 1 1 tA A t A t AA ρρ η ++ = − ++, (18) 
  () 1, 1 1 tz z t z t zz ρρ η ++ = − ++ . (19) 
                                                 
9 Dotsey, King and Wohlman [1999] used this technique to analyze a menu cost model.  Thomas [2002] 
and Veracierto [2002] used it to analyze investment.  King and Thomas [2006] analyze labor adjustment.    
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  I choose parameter values for illustrative purposes only.  The elasticity of supply 
ξ  is set to 1.  The autoregressive parameters  z ρ  and  A ρ  are set to imply a 6-month half-
life of the shocks and, together with the variances of the innovations  z η  and  A η , imply an 
unconditional variance of one percent for z and A.
10  I set the discount rate r to 2 percent 
annually.  I set the parameter α to 0.35 and I set T  to 10 so that firms adjust once every 
ten years in steady state.  I choose a ten year adjustment horizon because it is both a 
plausible calibration and also a good number for expositional purposes.  Since ten years 
is less frequent than the frequency of investment spikes in the Cooper et al. [1999] study 
(between five and six years), the fixed costs implied by the baseline calibration are 
greater than the data require.  The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 1. 
Because it plays a central role in governing the system, I consider several 
different depreciation rates.  By definition, long-lived capital goods have low 
depreciation rates.  I consider a capital good to be long-lived if it has an annual 
depreciation rate less than five percent.  Examples of such goods include manufacturing 
structures, commercial office buildings, electrical transmission and distribution 
apparatus, telecommunications structures, and so forth.  Most structures are long-lived 
capital goods (structures typically have depreciation rates between two and four percent).  
Because structures make up roughly thirty percent of all non-residential investment, long-
lived investments are not a trivial fraction of investment activity.  The baseline annual 
depreciation rate δ is 5 percent.   
 
4.2 Quantitative Analysis 
I can now assess the accuracy of the analysis from Section III.  I begin by considering 
temporary supply shocks and temporary demand shocks.  I also consider the quantitative 
role of the distribution in governing the equilibrium and in forecasting future price 
movements.   
 
                                                 
10 A 6-month half-life is fairly transitory compared with productivity shocks in the RBC literature.  TFP 
shocks with quarterly autoregressive roots of 0.95 have half-lives of almost 3.5 years.  The 6-month half-
life is a common degree of persistence in the price rigidity literature.  Allowing for more persistent shocks 
is straightforward.  For sufficiently long-lived capital, the neoclassical model and the fixed costs model 
behave identically regardless of the persistence.    
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Supply Shocks. I consider a positive innovation of one percent to  t z  in equation (17).  
This increases the cost of investment and shifts the supply schedule back.  I consider five 
annual depreciation rates: 0.20, 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01.  Twenty percent depreciation is 
comparable to depreciation rates experienced by computers, software and some vehicles.  
Typical business equipment has a depreciation rate of roughly ten percent per year.  The 
five, two and one percent depreciation rates correspond to depreciation rates of many 
structures (e.g., residential investment and business structures have depreciation rates of 
roughly two percent.  For more on empirical depreciation rates, see Fraumeni [1997]).    
  Figure 5 shows the system’s reaction to the temporary cost shock.  The top panel 
shows the response of aggregate investment.  The middle panel shows the response of the 
price level and the bottom panel shows the cost shock variable itself (the cost shock is the 
same for each depreciation rate).  In the figure, as one would expect from the earlier 
analysis, the equilibrium price of new investment changes only slightly in response to the 
shock.  For  0.10 δ =  and  0.20 δ = , the increase in prices on impact is roughly 12 basis 
points (0.12 percent).  For lower depreciation rates the price change is even smaller.  For 
example, for  0.01 δ =  and  0.02 δ = , the increase in prices is roughly 1 basis point 
(1/100
th the size of the impulse).  Since prices change only slightly, most of the 
adjustment to the shock occurs through changes in aggregate investment.  For each 
depreciation rate, the drop in investment is almost 1.00 percent.  For  0.01 δ =  and 
0.02 δ = , the drop is 0.99 percent.  For the higher depreciation rates, the drop in 
investment is roughly 0.9 percent.  This behavior is exactly what the earlier analysis 
predicted.  The approximation is better for low depreciation rates as the gap  () , GT δ  
approaches zero and the elasticity of demand approaches infinity.   
 
Demand Shocks. Figure 6 shows the response to a temporary one percent increase in 
productivity  t A .  Since supply is unchanged and since the elasticity of supply is 1.00, the 
reactions of prices and investment are identical.  As predicted, the changes in prices and 
investment are small.  For  0.20 δ =  and  0.10 δ = , prices and investment rise by roughly 
15 basis points and 8 basis points, respectively.  For  0.01 δ =  and  0.02 δ = , the increases 
are 3 basis points and 2.5 basis points.  Because the shock is transitory, the value of long- 
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lived capital goods is essentially unaffected.
11   
 
A Non-uniform Initial Distribution.  I now consider the equilibrium when the system 
begins with an out-of-steady-state distribution.
12  The initial distribution I consider has an 
unusually large number of firms with capital that is five years old.  To make the 
illustration stark, the initial density of firms with capital between 4.5 and 5.5 years old is 
twice the density elsewhere.  The distribution is shown in the top panel of Figure 7.  The 
steady state distribution is shown for comparison. Because the out-of-steady-state 
distribution has twice as many firms with five-year-old capital, one would anticipate that, 
in roughly five years, prices and investment would rise sharply as these firms approach 
the adjustment trigger.  If firms could not change the timing of investment at all, then 
prices and aggregate investment would rise by 100 percent.  
The middle panel of Figure 7 shows the equilibrium path of aggregate investment.  
Since the supply curve is stable and the elasticity of supply is 1.00, investment and prices 
are identical.  The initial distribution has some influence on the equilibrium.  The 
conventional supply and demand prediction that prices and investment should rise as the 
mass of firms adjusts is present in the figure but is quantitatively negligible relative to the 
magnitude of the distributional change.  Instead of an increase of 100 percent, investment 
rises by only one-half of one percent for capital with a ten percent depreciation rate.  For 
capital with a five percent depreciation rate, the equilibrium increase in investment is 
only 20 basis points.  The reason the distribution exerts such little influence on the 
equilibrium is the high intertemporal elasticity for the timing of investment combined 
with a slight increase in prices.   
The middle panel presented results for an elasticity of investment supply of 1.00.  
Some estimates of investment supply elasticities are substantially higher than this (see for 
example House and Shapiro [2008]).  If the intertemporal elasticity of investment 
demand were literally infinite (as it is in the low-depreciation limit), then the form of the 
                                                 
11 The near-infinite elasticity of investment demand implies that after-tax prices are constant for temporary 
shocks.  A temporary investment subsidy increases pre-tax prices by the amount of the subsidy.  House and 
Shapiro [2008] use this property to estimate ξ following the 2002 bonus depreciation provisions.  While 
their analysis uses a neoclassical model, the estimates are valid in a model with fixed-costs of adjustment.   
12 This thought experiment is inspired by Gourio and Kashyap [2007] who consider a similar out-of-
equilibrium experiment in their numerical model.    
23
supply curve would not matter at all. Since the elasticity of investment demand is actually 
finite, higher supply elasticities will temper the price changes and allow the distribution 
to play a slightly greater role.  The bottom panel of Figure 7 considers five different 
supply elasticities.  Each line corresponds to a different value of ξ .  The depreciation rate 
is set to its baseline value  0.05 δ = .  It is remarkable how little influence the supply 
elasticity has on the equilibrium.  Even with  20 ξ = , the maximum change in aggregate 
investment is only 2 percent.  Compared to the exogenous 100 percent increase in firms 
with five-year-old capital, this is very small.  Only for an elasticity of 100 does aggregate 
investment react noticeably, and even then by less than 10 percent. 
 
Using the Distribution to Forecast Prices. Another way to quantify the importance of the 
distribution of capital holdings it to ask whether it can be used to forecast prices.   Firms 
care about the distribution only because it contains information about future prices.  If the 
distribution is important in forecasting prices then the R
2 of a forecasting equation should 
be higher if we include information about the distribution.  The analysis in Section III 
suggests that, because the distribution of capital holdings has only minor bearing on the 
equilibrium, the improvement in forecasts of future prices (and investment) should be 
negligible.   
  Consider forecasting equations of the form 
  0
m
th p t zt At m t th m p pzA M e ββ β β β ++ =+ + + + + ∑ , (20) 
where h is the forecast horizon, the variables 
m
t M  are a set of moments of the date t 
distribution and e is a reduced-form error.  Although any set of moments is admissible, I 
consider the number of firms in each fifth of the capital space at time t.  Specifically, at 
time t, 
m














= ∑ , (21) 
for 1,...,5 m=  and where  ( ) t f a  is the number of firms with capital of age a at time t.  In 
the steady state,  1/5
m M =  for all m .    
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To assess the predictive value of these moments, I use the numerical model to 
calculate the asymptotic values of the coefficients in (20).
13  I consider the baseline 
parameter values and uncorrelated, i.i.d., supply and demand shocks  z η  and  A η .  The 
shocks are normally distributed with variances that, together with  A ρ  and  z ρ , imply  t z  
and  t A  have unconditional variances of one percent.     
  Table 2 reports the standard deviations of investment  t I , price  t p , the supply and 
demand variables  t z  and  t A  and the moments 
15 ,..., tt M M  from the numerical model.  
Table 3 reports estimated coefficients for the forecasting equation (20) for horizons 
h=1, 2, 4 and 8 quarters.  The most important forecasting variable is the price itself.  
The model implies that prices are very close to a random walk.  Thus, while the shocks 
have only small impacts on prices, the effects are long-lasting.  Notice that the 
coefficients on the moments, while small, are not zero.  The distribution is a true state 
variable so it is relevant for forecasting prices.  However, the gain in forecast accuracy 
measured by the change in R
2 as we add more and more moments is negligible (
5
t M  is 
not included because it is an exact linear combination of the other moments).  To a first 
approximation, it is reasonable for investors to simply ignore the distribution when 
forming expectations about future prices.   
  These findings are governed to some extent by parameter values.  Table 4 reports 
results for several different parameter values.  Each row reports the R
2 for particular 
forecast horizons and specifications (i.e., how many moments are included).  The 
columns consider different parameter values.  Column (0) reports results for the baseline 
specification.  Columns (1) – (9) consider models with baseline parameter values except 
for the parameter listed in the column heading.  Columns (1) – (3) consider depreciation 
rates δ =.02, .10, and .50;  (4) – (6) report results for supply elasticities ξ =5, 10, and 
100; (7) – (9) consider curvature parameters α =.50, .15, and .05.  Column (10) reports 
results from a “myopic” model with  .50 δ = ,  .50 r = ,  .10 α =  and  5 ξ = .   
  As in the baseline case, the performance of the forecasting equations is for the 
most part unchanged as we include additional moments of the distribution.  There are 
                                                 
13 The results reported below come from a simulation of 100,000 years of quarterly observations.    
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exceptions.  For high depreciation rates (e.g.  .50 δ = ) and for high supply elasticities 
(e.g. 100 ξ = ), the moments of the distribution matter somewhat.  The distribution also 
matters more for distant forecast horizons.  This is not surprising since the average 
adjustment horizon in the model is T = 10.  In the myopic calibration, the distribution 
matters at almost every horizon.
14   
 
4.3 Comparison with Neoclassical Investment Models 
Because both the fixed-cost model and the neoclassical investment model have extremely 
high elasticities of substitution for the timing of investment, the models should be 
difficult to distinguish using aggregate data alone.  In this section, I solve a standard 
neoclassical investment model and compare the equilibrium outcomes with a similarly 
calibrated fixed-cost model.   
  Figure 8 presents simulated data from both the neoclassical investment model and 
the fixed-cost model.  The neoclassical model is a standard discrete time investment 
model with flow production function  tt Ak
α.  The supply curve for both models is given 
by (17).  The parameters of both models are set to the baseline values in Table 1.  Both 
models are subjected to exactly the same sequence of shocks.   
The upper panels in Figure 8 show results for aggregate investment, while the 
lower panels show results for prices. The panels on the left show simulated time series.  
The thin black line is the fixed-cost model while the thick grey line is the neoclassical 
model.  While the time paths for aggregate investment are essentially identical, there are 
noticeable differences in the price series.  The middle panels show the impulse response 
to a cost shock like the one considered in Figure 5.  The response of aggregate investment 
is identical while the price response displays small differences.  The panels on the right 
show scatterplots of 500 years of quarterly data.  Each dot represents a data point from 
the neoclassical model and the corresponding data point from the fixed-cost model.   
                                                 
14 Careful readers will note that the R
2 in Krusell and Smith [1998] are much closer to 1.00 than those 
reported here.  While the model they study is different, the main cause of the difference is that Krusell and 
Smith approximate the contemporaneous pricing function  ({ })
m
tt pM  and forecast future prices with an 
approximate transition function for the moments themselves  1 :{ } { }
mm
tt QM M + → , while I form the price 
forecasts directly.  Regressing current prices pt on current states zt , At  and moments {}
m
t M , gives an R
2 
close to 1.00 (essentially regardless of the number of moments included).   I thank Gianluca Violante for 
particularly helpful comments on this point.    
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Again, the investment data are virtually the same (all the observations are on the 45 
degree line) while the price data display a noticeable difference.  This pattern is robust to 
wide variations in the parameters.   
Why is aggregate investment so similar across the two models while prices are 
not?  Two points are worth emphasizing.  First, the analysis in Section III said that the 
near-infinite elasticity of investment timing would eliminate price fluctuations in 
equilibrium.  That result, however, was only approximate in nature.  While the elasticity 
is very high, it is not infinite.  The fact that we observe price changes in the simulation 
reflects this approximation error.  Since observed changes in prices arise from 
imperfections in the approximation, we cannot use the approximations to argue that the 
price paths should be identical.   
Second, price changes reflect changes in the equilibrium value of capital.  In both 
cases, the price is tied to the long-run demand for capital.  Unlike the demand for 
investment, which can be characterized by a (nearly) flat demand curve, the long-run 
demand for capital is downward sloping and the shape of this demand curve depends on 
the details of the model.  In the neoclassical model, the price reflects the discounted 
marginal product of capital.  In the fixed-cost model, the price reflects the discounted 
average product of capital.  Thus, while we can ignore the details of the demand side of 
the model when we analyze investment, we cannot ignore these details when we analyze 
the long-run demand for capital.  Since the price depends on the demand for capital, it is 
not surprising that we observe different equilibrium price paths.
15      
 
4.4 Relation to DSGE Models. 
Most of the other well-known work in this area considers the numerical evaluation of 
calibrated DSGE models.  Superficially, the investment supply and demand framework 
analyzed here—the supply side in particular—may seem fundamentally different from 
the DSGE models.  Here I briefly consider the relationship of my model to DSGE 
models.  I pay particular attention to the analog of the supply curve in the GE models.   
                                                 
15 Caplin and Leahy [2004] use a model with fixed costs and permanent shocks to establish a mapping 
between the parameters of the fixed-cost model and the neoclassical model such that the equilibria are the 
same.  Their analysis requires a key assumption to keep the distribution of capital close to the steady state.  
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Consider the following conventional one-good general equilibrium model. A 
representative agent maximizes utility  () () {} 0
j
tt j t j j Eu C v N β
∞
++ = − ∑  subject to 
() , tt t t FKN C I =+  and  ( ) 1 1 tt t KK I δ + = − + .  Here C is consumption, N is labor,  () F ⋅  
is the production function, I is investment and K is the capital stock.   
The marginal cost of an additional unit of investment at date t is the marginal 
utility of consumption  () ' t uC.  The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with 
respect to investment is the analog of the elasticity of supply in the framework in Section 
III.  That is,  () ( ) () '' / I uC uI ξ ⎡⎤ = ∂∂ × ⎣⎦ .  Near the steady state  
 
11 '' '' ' ''
'' '




−− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ = −− ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (22) 
' F  and  '' F  are the first and second derivatives of the production function F with respect 
to labor N.  The elasticity of supply will be high if the curvature terms  () '' ' Cuu ⋅ , 
() '' ' Nvv ⋅  and  () '' ' NFF ⋅  are small or if the ratios  () ' F NI  and CI are large.   
If investment is small relative to total labor product and total consumption, then 
large percent changes in investment do not entail large percent changes in either 
consumption or labor and thus the percent increase in marginal cost is limited.  Likewise, 
if the curvature terms are low then there can be large swings in consumption and labor 
without large changes in the marginal utility of consumption, the marginal disutility of 
labor, or the marginal product of labor.  Consider the standard example:  ()
1 1
uC C σ −





=  and  ( ) , FKN KN
γθ = ; σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for 
consumption, η  is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and θ  is the elasticity of output with 











A reasonable calibration might be  0.2 σ = , 1/2 η = , and  2/3 θ = .  If we assume that the 
investment to GDP ratio is roughly 0.15 then  /6 . 6 YI ≈  and  /5 . 6 CI ≈ .  In this case, 
the elasticity implied by (23) is roughly 3.  If  1 ση == , then the implied elasticity is 8.9.   
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Based on the analysis above, these calibrations will not permit micro-level heterogeneity 
to play a noticeable role in the equilibrium.   
Assuming that the one-good DSGE framework is correct, one could estimate the 
parameters and calculate the implied elasticity.  In her original paper, Thomas [2002] 
calibrates her model so that  1 σ =  and η =∞, which would seem to be indulging in a 
parameterization that gives micro-level heterogeneity a good chance to play a role.  The 
investment to GDP ratio implied by her model is 0.20.  The implied elasticity in her 
model is roughly 14.  The baseline calibration in Bachmann et al. [2008] has  1 σ = , 
η =∞ and an investment to GDP ratio of 0.145 implying  20 ξ ≈ .  They also consider 
10 σ = , which gives  73 ξ ≈ .  Alternatively, one could estimate the elasticity directly.  
House and Shapiro [2008] use variation in tax rates to estimate ξ .  Their estimates 
suggest that ξ  is between 6 and 13.     
 
4.5 Discussion. 
In this section I explain why the near-infinite intertemporal elasticity of investment 
demand is the source of the “irrelevance results” found by the earlier literature.  I also 
briefly discuss credit constraints, idiosyncratic shocks, and the cyclicality of aggregate 
investment.   
 
The Source of the Irrelevance Results. The analysis in this paper strengthens and extends 
the “irrelevance results” obtained in many earlier papers on fixed costs in equilibrium 
settings.  Prominent examples include Thomas [2002], Veracierto [2002], Gourio and 
Kashyap [2007], and Khan and Thomas [2003, 2008].  Broadly speaking, these papers 
show that the distribution of capital holdings matters if prices are held constant, but the 
distributional effects on aggregate investment vanish in general equilibrium.   
The main contribution of this paper is to reveal the source of the irrelevance results. 
My numerical results echo the earlier findings in a more general setting, showing that 
specific reasons for an upward sloping investment supply schedule are not essential. In 
contrast, most of the earlier research attributes the irrelevance results to consumption 
smoothing motives.  For example, in her 2002 paper Thomas writes (p. 510) that the 
“households’ preference for smooth consumption profiles restrains shifts in investment  
29
demand.  This dampening force plays the predominant role in equilibrium investment 
determination and produces the invariance result.”  The consumption smoothing 
incentive results in “pronounced differences in interest rates” (Thomas, p. 527) and 
“procyclical real wage(s)” (Thomas, p. 530).  Thus, “equilibrium price movements 
smooth the economy’s response to such a degree that distributional effects are 
eliminated” (Thomas, p. 511).
16 
This reasoning is, however, incomplete.  While price movements are a “dampening” 
force which “restrains” investment demand, the earlier work did not find that the partial 
equilibrium results were dampened; they were eliminated entirely.  Moreover, the price 
movements at the heart of the explanation are barely detectable in the earlier papers (see 
for instance Figures 5 and 6 in this paper, or Figures 4.a and 4.b in Thomas [2002]).  The 
missing link in the explanation is the near-infinite intertemporal elasticity of investment 
demand.  Extreme price sensitivity implies that price movements are virtually eliminated 
in equilibrium.  While the distribution may change, it has no bearing on aggregate 
investment because firms are willing to delay or accelerate the timing of their 
investments by seemingly large amounts in response to small price changes.  The precise 
source of price movements is irrelevant.  Consumption smoothing and variations in 
interest rates play no role in the result.  In my model there is no representative consumer 
and interest rates are assumed constant.   
 
Idiosyncratic Shocks, Credit Constraints and One-Hoss Shays.   The model intentionally 
abstracts from a variety of complicating features to expose the mechanisms at work.  
Undoubtedly many firms base their investment decisions on factors other than price.  For 
example, many firms face binding credit constraints when making investment decisions.  
Idiosyncratic demand or supply considerations also surely play an important role in 
determining investment timing.  Some firms simply have to replace capital because of an 
unforeseen event like a fire or a flood which might cause their existing capital stock to 
fail suddenly – a “one-hoss shay” depreciation process.      
                                                 
16 This reasoning permeates the literature.  In their most recent paper, Khan and Thomas [2008] write that 
“movements in relative prices […] eliminate the implications of plant-level nonconvexities for aggregate 
dynamics.”  The effects disappear because “procyclical […] real wages and interest rates substantially 
dampen the changes in plants’ target capital stocks […]” (p. 429).   
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Surprisingly, as long as some firms are free to re-time their investments as the 
model here assumes, complications like those mentioned above leave the basic results 
intact.  Firms that are free to re-time their investments effectively arbitrage away 
predictable movements in investment prices.  The other firms invest as their 
circumstances dictate (due to credit conditions or other firm-specific factors).  The 
presence of firms that can freely change the timing of their investments will imply that 
the expected price of investment goods remains nearly constant and thus, again, 
aggregate investment is determined by investment supply alone.
17   
 
The Cyclicality of Aggregate Investment. Aggregate investment is highly cyclical.   
Figures 5 and 6 suggest that most variation in aggregate investment comes from 
investment supply shocks rather than demand shocks.  This is not a necessary feature of 
investment in fixed-cost models.  The reason demand shocks play such a small role here 
is that they are temporary.  Permanent (or very long-lasting) changes to the productivity 
of capital will shift investment demand and cause sharp changes in both investment and 
prices.  In addition, the supply shocks need not be investment-specific.  A general 
technology shock, like that in conventional RBC models, increases both supply and 
demand for investment (i.e., a one-percent productivity shock would increase A and z 
simultaneously by one percent).  
  As seen in the data, most of the fluctuations in aggregate investment in the model 
are associated with changes in the number of firms making adjustments.  There is some 
variation in investment for each firm that adjusts, since, by delaying or accelerating the 
timing of investment, the firm influences the size of its capital purchases  () kk T − .  
However, since depreciation is slow, the implied variation in  () kT is quite small.   
 
Breaking the Irrelevance Result. The reason for the irrelevance results is the 
extraordinarily high elasticity of investment demand.  A modification that would break 
the irrelevance result must interfere directly with this elasticity.  Unfortunately, this 
elasticity cannot be traced to a single free parameter.  Instead, the near-infinite elasticity 
                                                 
17 Khan and Thomas [2003] numerically demonstrate that idiosyncratic shocks have little impact on the 
equilibrium in a DSGE model with fixed investment adjustment costs.    
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arises naturally in models of long-lived investments.  If there is a parameter in the model 
that governs this elasticity it is  ( ) r δδ +  – a combination of parameters that are not 
subject to much dispute.  For the distribution of capital to play a role at the aggregate 
level, there must be some additional friction that tempers the firms’ willingness (or their 
ability) to delay or accelerate investment.  These frictions could take the form of planning 
costs which inhibit the firm’s ability to adjust the timing of their investments, or 
information costs which prevent the firms from reacting to small price changes.  In any 
case, a mechanism that succeeds in breaking the irrelevance result must not only make 
demand less elastic, it must do so for virtually all firms in the economy.  If some firms 
are free to adjust the timing of their investments, the irrelevance result will emerge.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The study of investment is of central importance to understanding business cycles and 
economic activity.  The drive to base aggregate theories on solid micro-foundations as 
well as the desire to match firm-level investment patterns has led to the development of 
complex models of investment behavior at the firm level.  Investment models featuring 
fixed costs of adjustment are attractive because they imply that investment at the plant-
level will be infrequent, as seen in micro data sets.  In this paper, I have analyzed the 
approximate equilibrium behavior of a dynamic investment model with fixed adjustment 
costs.  The analysis shows that for sufficiently long-lived capital goods, the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution for the timing of investment is extremely high.  As the 
depreciation rate approaches zero, this elasticity approaches infinity.  The near-infinite 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution eliminates virtually any role for microeconomic 
heterogeneity in governing investment demand.  This high elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is a property that conventional neoclassical models of investment demand 
and models with fixed costs have in common.  Thus, even though simple neoclassical 
investment models are starkly at odds with the micro data, they capture virtually all of the 
relevant aggregate investment dynamics embodied in models with fixed investment 
adjustment costs.  This finding is highly robust and explains why researchers working in 
the DSGE tradition have found little role for fixed costs in numerical trials.  Because the 
differences between the two models are small for plausible depreciation rates and vanish  
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in the low-depreciation limit, conventional models offer an easy and accurate vehicle for 
economic analysis of investment decisions at the aggregate level. 
Earlier numerical studies demonstrated that in many cases, DSGE models with 
fixed costs have aggregate dynamics that are virtually the same as the aggregate 
dynamics of conventional DSGE models that ignore fixed costs at the micro-level.  My 
analysis makes two basic contributions to this research area.  First, it shows why the 
irrelevance results occur in the numerical studies.  The similarity at the aggregate level is 
not caused by consumption smoothing in a general equilibrium setting.  Rather it is due to 
the extreme willingness on the part of firms to adjust the timing of investment to take 
advantage of predictable price changes.  The firms are so willing to retime their 
investments that in equilibrium there can be no such price changes.  With prices pinned 
down, aggregate investment is simply determined by the supply curve.  Consumption 
smoothing is just one example of a source of increasing marginal costs of investment.  
Decreasing returns to scale in the production of capital goods, upward sloping labor 
supply curves or rising input costs of any sort will all cause marginal costs to rise and 
eliminate any meaningful role for fixed costs in governing aggregate investment.   
Second, the analysis suggests mechanisms that could undo the apparent 
irrelevance of fixed costs.  Specifically, anything which causes firms to resist changing 
the timing of their investments can potentially revive the potency of the distribution as a 
state variable and thus make the fixed cost model and the neoclassical model behave 
differently.  These frictions must apply to many, if not all, firms.  Frictions such as 
idiosyncratic shocks or credit constraints which constrain some firms but not others will 
leave the equilibrium largely unchanged as the other firms freely re-time their 
investments and eliminate price movements through arbitrage.  In the absence of frictions 
that inhibit firms’ freedom or incentive to change the timing of investments, fixed cost 
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This appendix presents the numerical model analyzed in “Fixed Costs and Long-Lived Investments” by
C.L.House.
Numerical Model:
Here I present details on the numerical model used to analyze the behavior of the system away from the
low-depreciation limit. The numerical solution follows the approach advanced by Dotsey, King and Wohlman
[1999], Thomas [2002], Veracierto [2002], and Khan and Thomas [2003], King and Thomas [2006].
The numerical model is in discrete time. The size of each time interval is ∆. The possible capital stocks
are given by a list of length J +1so that kj is the capital stock for a ﬁrm that last adjusted j periods ago.
Then, kj+1 = kje−δ∆ and k0 = ¯ k. The minimum possible capital stock is kJ.L e tVj,t be the value of having
kj at the beginning of period t and let ¯ Vt be the value of having ¯ k at the beginning of period t.T h e s ev a l u e s
are time-dependent because prices and other endogenous variables ﬂuctuate over time.
The key aspect of the numerical approach is the use of idiosynchratic ﬁxed costs rather than the single
ﬁxed cost F.E a c hﬁrm i is presented with a ﬁx e dc o s ta tt i m et given by εi,t.T h eﬁxed costs are i.i.d. across
ﬁrms and over time. The ﬁxed cost is assumed to have positive support (i.e., εit takes values in [0,∞))a n d
to have mean F. I assume the stochastic ﬁxed cost has a density function ψ (ε) and associated distribution
Ψ(ε). For purposes of computation, I take ε to be a mixture of a log normally distributed variable εLN and
a wide uniform εU.
The log normal random variable obeys ln
¡
εLN¢
∼ Φ(μ,σ) where Φ is a Gaussian distribution with mean
μ and variance σ2.B e c a u s eIr e q u i r eE [εit]=F, for any σ, the parameter μ must satisfy




which follows from a well-known property of log-normal distributions. Thus, once F is given, the log normal
distribution has only a single free parameter: σ. The wide uniform variable has density 1
2F. centered around
F.T h eﬁnal composite random variable is ε = ωεLN +( 1− ω)εU with ω ∈ (0,1). Thus the expected value












































ds. In the numerical setup below, I also require
the truncated expectation
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Since the Vj,t’s are the values of having kj at the beginning of period t,w ec a nw r i t e
Vj,t (ε)=m a x
©
∆ · ztkα
j + βEt [vj+1,t+1],∆ · zt¯ kα + βEt [v1,t+1] − ε − pt




Vj,t (ε)ψ (ε)dε is the expected value of being in state j at time t prior to the realization of
the stochastic ﬁxed cost ε. For the lowest capital stock kJ I assume that the ﬁrm must adjust and pays F
with certainty. Thus, the expected value of entering the last grid point is
vJ,t = VJ,t = ∆ · zt¯ kα + βEt [v1,t+1] − F − pt
¡¯ k − kJ
¢
(2)
37Deﬁne ˆ εj,t as the critical draw for the ﬁxed cost for ﬁrms in position j at time t that makes them just
indiﬀerent between adjusting and not:
ˆ εj,t = ∆ · zt
£¯ kα − kα
j
¤
+ βEt [v1,t+1 − vj+1,t+1] − pt
£¯ k − kj
¤
(3)








∆ · zt¯ kα + βEt [v1,t+1] − ε − pt
¡¯ k − kj
¢¤
ψ (ε)dε +[ 1− Ψ(ˆ εj,t)]
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εψ (ε)dε +[ 1− Ψ(ˆ εj,t)]
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∆ · ztkα
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+ βEt [v1,t+1 − vj+1,t+1] − pt








j + βEt [vj+1,t+1]
¢
= Ψ(ˆ εj,t)ˆ εj,t −
Z ˆ εj,t
0
εψ(ε)dε + ∆ · ztkα
j + βEt [vj+1,t+1]
Thus, we have
vj,t = Ψ(ˆ εj,t)ˆ εj,t −
Z ˆ εj,t
0
εψ (ε)dε + ∆ · ztkα
j + βvj+1,t+1 (4)







where It is total (aggregate) investment at time t and ξ > 0 is the elasticity of supply.
Steady State:
I normalize the supply curve so that in the steady state pt = p =1 . There is then the question of how one
can solve for the steady state values vj, ˆ εj. It is tempting to use the solution from the non-stochastic model
in Section III of the text to ﬁnd ¯ V however this is not correct. The presence of the stochastic ﬁxed costs
(rather than the pure ﬁxed cost F) makes the value of being at ¯ k higher than otherwise because the ﬁrm has
the option to adjust early to take advantage of a low ﬁxed cost or to adjust late and avoid a high ﬁxed cost.
To ﬁnd the steady state of the modiﬁed model I follow the procedure outlined below:
1. Pick parameters r αδσωJ and T.S e tμ from equation (1). Set the step size ∆. The discount factor
is β = e−r∆.
2. Set ¯ k at the non-stochastic level from equation (6) in the text. Construct the grid k1 = ¯ ke−δ∆,
k2 = ¯ ke−δ2∆, ... kj = ¯ ke−δj∆.
3. Set v1 (Note for the initial guess of v1, I appeal to the non-stochastic setting in the text in which case
¯ V ≈ ∆ · ¯ kα + βv1. The initial setting of v1 is therefore v1 ≈ β
−1 ¡¯ V − ∆ · ¯ kα¢
).
4. Equation (2) gives the steady state vJ = VJ as
vJ = VJ = ∆ · ¯ kα + βv1 − F −
¡¯ k − kJ
¢
.
5. Equation (3) then implies ˆ εJ−1
ˆ εJ−1 = ∆ ·
£¯ kα − kα
J−1
¤
+ β [v1 − vJ] −
£¯ k − kJ−1
¤
.
6. I then calculate vJ−1 via quadrature using equation (4)
vJ−1 = Ψ(ˆ εJ−1)ˆ εJ−1 −
Z ˆ εJ−1
0
εψ (ε)dε + ∆ · kα
J−1 + βvJ
387. Then given vj+1 we can calculate ˆ εj with equation (3)
ˆ εj = ∆ ·
£¯ kα − kα
j
¤
+ β [v1 − vj+1] −
£¯ k − kj
¤
and vj with (4)
vj = Ψ(ˆ εj)ˆ εj −
Z ˆ εj
0
εψ (ε)dε + ∆ · kα
j + βvj+1
8. I repeat step (7) until I arrive at an implied v1 say v0
1. If my initial guess v1 = v0
1 then I have a set of
steady state values and cutoﬀs. If not, I update v1 and repeat from step 3. The steady state cutoﬀs ˆ εj
values imply adjustment probabilities Ψj = Ψ(ˆ εj) f o re a c hg r i dp o i n tj =1 ,2,...J −1 and I set ΨJ =1
since they must adjust at this point.
Equilibrium:




Ψj,t · fj,t ·
¡¯ k − kj
¢
The total number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed
PJ
j=1 fj,t =1 . Note, the numbers of ﬁrms at each grid point evolve
according to
fj,t = fj−1,t−1 (1 − Ψj−1,t−1)





so that all of the ﬁrms that adjusted last period arrive at gridpoint 1 the following period. To ﬁnd the steady
state values for fj Iu s e




for all j between 2 and J. Then, to ﬁnd f1,Iu s e
J X
j=1













The following auxiliary parameters are used in the numerical model: σ =0 .0025, ω =0 .99, ∆ =1 /4 and
J =8 0 . The model is linearized and solved with the Anderson-Moore (AIM) algorithm.
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TABLE 1.  BASELINE PARAMETERS 
 
Parameter Baseline  Value 
Discount rate, annual (r ) 0.02 
Curvature of profit function (α) 0.35 
Steady state adjustment horizon (T ) (years)  10.00 
Elasticity of aggregate investment supply (ξ )  1.00 
Half-life of demand shock (years)  0.50 






TABLE 2: STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF SIMULATED DATA 
 
Standard Deviations 
t I   t p   t z   t A  
1
t M  
2
t M  
3
t M  
4
t M  
5
t M  
0.961 0.127 1.000 1.000 0.179 0.174 0.165 0.156 0.494 
Correlation Matrix 
t I   t p   t z   t A  
1
t M  
2
t M  
3
t M  
4
t M  
5
t M  
1.000 -0.266 -0.993  0.059  0.406 -0.067 -0.081 -0.066 -0.075 
-0.266  1.000  0.382  0.426 -0.773 -0.680 -0.569 -0.456  0.853 
-0.993 0.382 1.000  -0.002  -0.487  -0.022 0.006 0.005 0.180 
0.059 0.426  -0.002 1.000 0.033 0.007 0.002 0.003  -0.016 
0.406  -0.773  -0.487 0.033 1.000 0.482 0.328 0.318  -0.742 
-0.067  -0.680  -0.022 0.007 0.482 1.000 0.452 0.294  -0.770 
-0.081  -0.569 0.006 0.002 0.328 0.452 1.000 0.417  -0.744 
-0.066  -0.456 0.005 0.003 0.318 0.294 0.417 1.000  -0.673 
-0.075 0.853 0.180  -0.016  -0.742 -0.770 -0.744 -0.673  1.000 
         
 
Note: The table shows the standard deviations and correlation coefficients for simulated variables: 
Investment, prices, supply parameters, productivity parameters, and moments 
j
t M .  The moments are 
described in the text.  The data are simulated from a version of the model with  .05 δ = .  The supply and 
demand shocks are normally distributed and independent.  Their variances are set to imply a 1 percent 
unconditional standard deviation in the long run.  The estimated coefficients come from a simulated data 




















TABLE 3: FORECASTING EQUATIONS FOR INVESTMENT PRICES 
 
Forecast 
Horizon  Forecast Coefficients 
 
0 β   p β   z β   A β   1 β   2 β   3 β   4 β   R
2 
0.000  0.981  0.001  -0.016  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.877 
0.001 0.978 0.001 -0.016  -0.002  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.877 
0.002 0.972 0.001 -0.015  -0.004  -0.003  n.a.  n.a.  0.877 
0.005  0.951  0.001 -0.014 -0.010 -0.008 -0.005  n.a.  0.877 
0.008  0.937  0.002 -0.013 -0.015 -0.011 -0.008 -0.002 0.877 
1 quarter 
         
0.000  0.961  0.001  -0.027  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.804 
0.001 0.957 0.001 -0.026  -0.004  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.804 
0.003 0.943 0.002 -0.026  -0.007  -0.007  n.a.  n.a.  0.804 
0.010  0.904  0.002 -0.023 -0.020 -0.016 -0.010  n.a.  0.804 
0.013  0.890  0.003 -0.023 -0.024 -0.019 -0.013 -0.002 0.804 
2 quarters 
         
0.000  0.924  0.002  -0.039  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.719 
0.002 0.914 0.002 -0.038  -0.008  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.719 
0.007 0.886 0.003 -0.037  -0.015  -0.014  n.a.  n.a.  0.719 
0.019  0.814  0.004 -0.033 -0.038 -0.030 -0.018  n.a.  0.719 
0.022  0.799  0.005 -0.032 -0.043 -0.034 -0.021 -0.002 0.719 
1 year 
         
0.000  0.850  0.004  -0.046  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.612 
0.004 0.828 0.003 -0.044  -0.018  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.612 
0.013 0.775 0.004 -0.041  -0.032  -0.025  n.a.  n.a.  0.612 
0.032  0.668  0.007 -0.035 -0.067 -0.050 -0.028  n.a.  0.612 
0.030  0.680  0.006 -0.036 -0.063 -0.047 -0.026 0.001  0.612 
2 years 
         
 
Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients for reduced-form forecasting equations of the form 
0
m
th p t zt At m t th m p pzA M e ββ β β β ++ =+ + + + + ∑  where 
m
t M  are moments of the cross-sectional 
distribution of capital holdings at date t.  The moments are described in the text.  The data are simulated 
from a version of the model with  .05 δ = .  The supply and demand shocks are normally distributed and 
independent.  Their variances are set to imply a 1 percent unconditional standard deviation in the long run.  
The estimated coefficients come from a simulated data set of 100,000 years of quarterly observations.    
 TABLE 4: PRICE FORECASTS (R
2), SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
 
Model  Forecast 
Horizon  Moments 
(0) (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
   Baseline  .02 δ =   .10 δ =   .50 δ =   5 ξ =   10 ξ =   100 ξ =   .50 α =   .15 α =   .05 α =   Myopic 
0  0.880 0.923 0.837 0.692  0.927  0.920 0.849 0.867 0.905 0.910 0.624 
1  0.880 0.923 0.837 0.692  0.927  0.920 0.849 0.867 0.905 0.910 0.624 
2  0.880 0.923 0.838 0.692  0.927  0.920 0.849 0.867 0.905 0.910 0.624 
3  0.880 0.923 0.838 0.692  0.927  0.920 0.849 0.867 0.905 0.910 0.626 
4  0.880 0.923 0.838 0.692  0.927  0.920 0.849 0.867 0.905 0.910 0.632 
1 quarter 
               
0  0.809 0.878 0.740 0.524  0.865  0.847 0.708 0.790 0.843 0.849 0.449 
1  0.809 0.878 0.740 0.524  0.865  0.847 0.708 0.790 0.843 0.849 0.449 
2  0.809 0.878 0.740 0.525  0.865  0.847 0.708 0.790 0.843 0.849 0.451 
3  0.809 0.878 0.740 0.525  0.866  0.847 0.709 0.790 0.843 0.849 0.457 
4  0.809 0.878 0.740 0.525  0.866  0.847 0.710 0.790 0.843 0.849 0.475 
6 months 
               
0  0.726 0.826 0.625 0.358  0.759  0.715 0.473 0.703 0.762 0.765 0.259 
1  0.726 0.826 0.625 0.358  0.759  0.715 0.473 0.703 0.762 0.765 0.261 
2  0.726 0.826 0.625 0.359  0.759  0.715 0.474 0.703 0.762 0.765 0.269 
3  0.726 0.826 0.626 0.361  0.760  0.716 0.477 0.703 0.762 0.766 0.296 
4  0.726 0.826 0.626 0.361  0.760  0.716 0.478 0.703 0.762 0.766 0.321 
1 year 
               
0  0.622 0.761 0.478 0.189  0.578  0.497 0.191 0.598 0.647 0.640 0.067 
1  0.622 0.761 0.479 0.191  0.578  0.498 0.192 0.598 0.647 0.641 0.078 
2  0.622 0.761 0.480 0.196  0.579  0.499 0.197 0.598 0.647 0.641 0.108 
3  0.622 0.761 0.480 0.200  0.580  0.500 0.204 0.598 0.647 0.641 0.164 
2 years 
4  0.622 0.761 0.480 0.200  0.580  0.500 0.204 0.598 0.647 0.641 0.165 
 
 
Note: The table shows the R
2 for different forecasting equations, model specifications and forecast horizons.  Forecast equations are of the form 
0
m
th p t zt At m t th m p pzA M e ββ β β β ++ =+ + + + + ∑  where 
m
t M  are moments as described in the text.  Column 1 is the baseline calibration.   
Columns 2 – 10 consider alternate calibrations.  Parameter changes are described in the column heading.  Parameters not listed are kept at baseline 
values.  Column 11 (Myopic) gives results for  .50 δ = ,  .50 r = ,  .10 α =  and  5 ξ = .  Supply and demand shocks are normally distributed and 
independent with variances set to imply a 1 percent unconditional standard deviation.  Statistics come from a simulation of 100,000 years of 
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FIGURE 2: TWO DISTRIBUTIONS OF CAPITAL HOLDINGS.  
 
The shaded rectangle represents the uniform steady state distribution.  In this case, there is an even number 
of firms with capital t years old for  () 0,10 t ∈ .  The heavy grey line represents an extreme alternative 
distribution.  There are mass points of firms with 1-year-old capital, 3-year-old capital, etc.  Each mass point 
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Jorgenson Gap, G(δ,T), Long-Lived Capital







T = 10 
 





































Notes: The lines plot price paths p(t) for which the firms are indifferent as to when they adjust their capital stock.  The paths were made under 
the assumption that the reset value V  was constant.  The steady state price level is 1.00.   
















δ = .02 
 


































































δ = .01 
 
 

































































δ = .01 
 















































































Steady State Distribution 





































Notes: The parameter values for the fixed-cost model are given in Table 1.  The neoclassical model is described in the text.  Parameter 
values are identical to those in the fixed cost model.  The scatter-plot shows 500 years of simulated data.  Both models experienced 
identical shocks.  
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